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Twenty Years of Women, Peace and Security National Action Plans: Analysis and Lessons Learned

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We acknowledge the tradition of custodianship and law of the Country on which the University of Sydney campuses stand. We pay our respects to those who have cared and continue to care for Country.

Introduction

In October 2000, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). This signalled a major shift in the governance of international peace and security, in that it recognised women as a specific population group affected by conflict.¹ The resolution recognised that women and girls experience violence as a result of armed conflict in unique and complex ways by virtue of their gender, and that they have an inherent right to participate in peace negotiations and reconstruction efforts that directly affect their lives.²

The nine Women, Peace and Security (WPS) resolutions that followed UNSCR 1325 expand on this premise and construct the framework to support these and other related principles. These resolutions cover a wide range of topics under the rubric of peace and security, from operationalising WPS, developing indicators, and measuring outcomes (UNSCR 2106, UNSCR 1889, UNSCR 2122, UNSCR 2242, and UNSCR 2493) to recognising the weaponisation of sexual violence in armed conflict and developing strategies to combat it, and increasing access to justice for victims of sexual violence (UNSCR 1820, UNSCR 1888, UNSCR 1960, and UNSCR 2467).

National Action Plans (NAPs) are a strategic tool for policymakers to operationalise and translate the international mandates of the WPS agenda into the domestic context.³ However, despite the adoption of UNSCR 1325 in the year 2000, NAPs did not become a UN priority until the release of two Security Council presidential statements, in 2004 and 2005, encouraging the adoption of NAPs as a means of implementation.⁴ Researchers and practitioners alike had, in the years prior, pointed out a lacuna in WPS implementation strategies. NAPs, then, became a means to 'effectively translate this international framework into actionable changes at the national and local level',⁵ and UNSCRs 2122 and 1889 encouraged UN member states to develop NAPs for the implementation of WPS.

NAPs represent the institutionalisation of UNSCR 1325 by states.⁶ As of August 2019, 42% of states – or a total of 82 countries – had released NAPs.⁷ For policymakers and scholars of the WPS agenda, NAPs represent a concrete step by states to fulfil their objectives regarding UNSCR 1325 and the other resolutions that make up the WPS agenda.⁸

1 Miller, B., M. Pournik, and A. Swaine (2014) 'Women in peace and security through United Nations Security resolution 1325: Literature review, content analysis of National Action Plans, and implementation' *PeaceWomen*; Tryggstad, T.L. (2009) 'Trick or treat? The UN and implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security', *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 15(4): 539–557.

2 Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 'Women in peace and security', 6; Pratt, N., and S. Richter-Devroe (2011) 'Critically examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security', *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 13(4): 489–503, 490–491.

3 Jacevic, M.M. (2018) 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', In S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 274–289, 274.

4 See UNSC (2004) 'Statement by the President of the Security Council', and UNSC (2005) 'Statement by the President of the Security Council'.

5 Jacevic, 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', 274.

6 Though we do not consider them in this report, Regional Action Plans (RAPs) also exist; as of the time of writing, there were 11 RAPs (WILPF 2019). RAPs, in contrast to NAPs, are intended as means of consolidating regional cooperation in furtherance of the agenda. They play a vital role by signalling a regional commitment to furthering the rights of women, and encouraging member states to follow through on or adopt their own NAPs; see True, J., and M. Mintrom (2001) 'Transnational networks and policy diffusion: The case of gender mainstreaming', *International Studies Quarterly*, 45(1): 27–57, 43, 48). However, RAPs can also suffer from a general lack of specificity regarding timelines and the roles of involved parties or agencies; little to no references to funding allocation or monitoring and evaluation indicators; and a tendency of policymakers to prioritise rhetorical commitments over substantive action. See Hudson, N.F. (2013) *National and Regional Implementation of Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security: Background Paper for Global Review Meeting*, paper presented at the UN Women Global Technical Review Meeting: Building accountability for implementation of Security Council resolutions on Women, Peace and Security.

7 It is also worth noting that not all states or regional organisations go down the route of a NAP; some states, such as Colombia and Thailand, instead choose to institutionalise the principles of WPS through their domestic gender equality legislation; see Jacevic, 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', 274.

8 Björkdahl, A. and J. Mannergren Selimovic (2015) 'Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national: Protection, representation and participation in the National Action Plans of Bosnia–Herzegovina and Rwanda', *Conflict, Security and Development*, 15(4): 311–335.

In this paper, we use both qualitative and quantitative analysis to answer the following research questions:

1. Which pillar(s) of the NAPs are dominant?
Is this changing over time?
2. What are the dominant categories of lead,
including over time and by region?
3. To what extent are new and/or emerging security
issues – such as terrorism, climate change and
reproductive rights – represented in the NAPs?
4. To what extent is a budget specified in the NAPs?
5. To what extent do the NAPs contain provisions
for monitoring and evaluation activities?
6. To what extent do the NAPs document the
participation of civil society in production
and implementation?

We conclude briefly with a discussion of the insights drawn from the analysis and some considerations and recommendations for future NAP development. In the following section, we briefly outline our dataset and the analytical approach that we took.

Our dataset and analytical approach

The dataset

Our dataset consists of the 81 states that had produced (and made available) National Action Plans (NAPs) as of August 2019 (excluding from the count of 82 referenced above the Namibian NAP which was at that point unavailable for analysis) but including WPS-related policies produced by two states (Tajikistan and Bougainville). Some states have produced multiple NAPs. Therefore, our complete dataset is comprised of 128 documents (see Appendix 1).

Of these, we consider 81 to be ‘current’ NAPs: these are either the NAP that a state has produced (if it is their only NAP), or the most recent NAP that a state has produced, if they have released multiple NAPs (see Appendix 2).

Data collection and analysis

The dataset consists of the NAPs that were publicly available as of August 2019. Where a NAP was not available in English, we had the document professionally translated. This created an English-language dataset of all available NAPs. Since then, new NAPs have been released – including by Namibia and Bangladesh – and we will continue to update the dataset as more NAPs become available.

For each NAP, we noted several data points: country, region, year of publication, and the government agency or organisation that co-ordinated the development of, or took responsibility for, the Plan (such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or the Ministry of Defence). In the case of the first three data points (country, region and year of publication), this information was easily drawn from the National Action Plans. However, in the case of the department or organisation responsible for co-ordination, this occasionally required subjective assessment; for example, both of the Ugandan National Action Plans (published in 2008 and 2011) are attributed to the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. We coded this under ‘Gender/Women’, though a convincing argument could be made for an alternative code, such as ‘Social Affairs’.

We also explored which of the pillars each NAP ‘skews’ towards (where sufficient data is available). These ‘skews’ are based on the raw counts of the pillars of ‘prevention’, ‘participation’ and ‘protection’ and are therefore

designed to give a sense of the pillar upon which the NAP places the greatest emphasis.⁹ Because of the volume of data, we opted not to code each instance of ‘prevention’, ‘participation’ and ‘protection’, instead conducting a raw count of the appearance of each pillar in the NAPs. While the benefit of this was that we were able to manage large amounts of data, the drawback is that these figures only give a general sense of the pillars, and don’t allow us to interrogate some of the potentially interesting overlaps in pillars, for example, or the different ways in which the pillars are used.

We then considered the prevalence of certain themes in the datasets (Appendix 3) and also went through each NAP individually, to investigate:

1. the level of budget specification
2. the extent to which monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was specified, and
3. the level of civil society involvement in the production and implementation of the Plan.

We scored these three elements according to six-point scales (as detailed in Appendices 4–6). There is a great deal of variation amongst NAPs, so even though we used these scales for the purposes of coding, an element of interpretive analysis was necessary when determining how extensively each NAP engaged with budgetary issues, monitoring and evaluation, and civil society input.

⁹ We have only included three of the pillars because we have not, at this stage, been able to find a straightforward way to code for the fourth pillar (humanitarian/relief and recovery) to accurately determine ‘skew’.

Analysis

1. Which pillar(s) of the NAPs are dominant? Is this changing over time?

WPS NAPs tend to focus, in varying degrees, on the four pillars established under UNSCR 1325: prevention; participation; protection; and relief and recovery (humanitarian programming).¹⁰ The degree to which a NAP focuses on one pillar or another can be read as a reflection of the priorities of each state or institution and the views of actors involved in the development of the NAPs.

However, there is often little stated about concrete actions or what is meant by each state when they reference these pillars.¹¹ The participation pillar, for example, has been taken to mean both increasing the

number of women in a peacekeeping-missions and facilitating meaningful participation in peace dialogues.¹² The pillar of prevention poses similar difficulties. Prevention in the context of the WPS agenda can relate broadly to the prevention of conflict, though recent years have seen states increasingly use the concept in the narrower context of preventing conflict-related sexual violence (and then often in a narrow criminal justice context as opposed to a more holistic, primary prevention approach).¹³ As Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate, until relatively recently, prevention was a somewhat neglected pillar of UNSCR 1325.¹⁴




Figure 1: Dominance of pillars in all NAPs over time (note that n = 127 here as Nepal had insufficient data)

¹⁰ Coomaraswamy, R., et al. (2015) *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, UN Women, 329.

¹¹ Shepherd, L.J., and J. True (2014) 'The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world: from rhetoric to commitment?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(3): 257-284, 278-280.

¹² Deiana, M.A. and K. McDonagh (2018) "'It is important, but...': Translating the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda into the planning of EU peacekeeping missions', *Peacebuilding*, 6(1): 34-48, 45-46.

¹³ Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 205; Basu, S. and C.C. Confortini (2016) 'Weakest "p" in the 1325 pod? Realizing conflict prevention through Security Council resolution 1325', *International Studies Perspectives*, 18(1): 43-63, 52; Basu, S. and L.J. Shepherd (2017) 'Prevention in pieces: representing conflict in the Women, Peace and Security agenda', *Global Affairs*, 3(4-5): 441-453, 441-442.

¹⁴ See also *ibid.*

As Figure 1 shows, on a raw count, the participation pillar has proved the most influential over time, though there is growth on the prevention pillar, particularly in recent years. Because of the rawness of the data (as discussed above), though, this could represent an increased desire to prevent conflict in the first place, or – and possibly more likely given that the CRSV-related resolutions were adopted in 2009 – it could relate to the prevention of CRSV. Protection has been an ongoing pillar across time, but recent times have seen fewer NAPs take protection as their dominant pillar, seemingly skewing instead towards participation. The notion of protection, as Björkdahl and Selimovic state, exposes the ‘unresolved tensions between “protection”, “representation”, and “participation” in UNSCR 1325 agenda’,¹⁵ and as a concept, ‘protection’ may not have the same appeal or potential as a transformative pillar of WPS as do participation and prevention.¹⁶

This trend can be seen even more clearly in Figure 2, where the prevention pillar ‘overtakes’ the protection pillar meaningfully for the first time in 2016 and has continued to appear with greater frequency than the protection pillar every year since. While it seems likely that participation will remain the most popular pillar in NAPs, we are interested to see if the upward trend in the prevention pillar will continue. We are also interested in more closely interrogating the contexts in which ‘prevention’ is – and has been – used conceptually, both within the NAPs and more broadly.




Figure 2: Pillars over time (weighted, n=128)

¹⁵ Björkdahl and Mannergren Selimovic, ‘Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national’, 313; see also Hudson, H. (2017) ‘The power of mixed messages: Women, Peace, and Security language in National Action Plans from Africa’, *Africa Spectrum*, 52(3): 3–29.

¹⁶ de Preux, J. (1985) ‘Special protection of women and children’, *International Review of the Red Cross*, 248; Björkdahl and Selimovic, ‘Translating UNSCR 1325 from the global to the national’, 328–329; Hudson, ‘The power of mixed messages’, 22–23.

2. Category of lead over time and by region

There is political significance of who is the lead actor named in a NAP. As Aisling Swaine argues, a NAP's positioning within a government will determine its focus (domestic or foreign policy, for example) and its level of influence (national women's machineries are typically lacking the resources and political status in many conflict-affected countries to strongly attract genuine political interest and funding).¹⁷

As Figure 3 shows, states have largely seen the WPS agenda as a matter for Foreign Affairs or departments that have a focus on Gender or Women. Both of these placements may be problematic.




Figure 3: Category of lead over time (n=128)

¹⁷ Swaine, A. (2009) 'Assessing the potential of National Action Plans to advance implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325', *Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law*, 12: 403-433, 417.

The placement in Foreign Affairs can result in outward-facing NAPs, which see WPS as an agenda which addresses problems that occur 'elsewhere' – such as in the global South.¹⁸ This outward orientation positions WPS as a matter of foreign policy, aimed at (usually conflict-affected) areas outside of the territory of the authoring state. Consequently, these NAPs tend to conceive of WPS in narrow militarised terms, often focusing on the sufficient representation of women within the armed forces.¹⁹ These NAPs also tend to ignore the role(s) that the authoring states may play in fuelling conflict or insecurity beyond their own borders.

The positioning of WPS in gender or women-focused agencies, on the other hand, reinforces a demarcation between women's issues and peace and security.²⁰

In doing so, it perpetuates the very framing that UNSCR 1325 is aimed at dismantling. As Lee-Koo argues, 'For a NAP to be successful it needs to be prioritised on the Government agenda across all portfolios' – and not confined to one (frequently under-resourced and over-stretched) portfolio.²¹

When we organise these data by region (Figure 4), the differences in category of lead are striking. National Action Plans coming out of countries in Africa and the Middle East, and to a large extent Oceania, account for the vast majority of Gender/Women NAP leads, whereas NAPs from Europe, North America and South America are overwhelmingly more likely to have Foreign Affairs as a lead agency or to take a whole-of-government approach.




Figure 4: Category of NAP lead by region (n=128)

18 Lee-Koo, K. and B.K. Trojanowska (2017) 'Does the United Nations' Women, Peace and Security agenda speak with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific? The development of National Action Plans in the Asia Pacific', *Critical Studies on Security*, 5(3): 287-301, 296; Shepherd, L.J. (2016) 'Making war safe for women? National Action Plans and the militarisation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda', *International Political Science Review*, 37(3): 324-335, 325.

19 Shepherd, 'Making war safe for women?', 325; Basu and Shepherd, 'Prevention in Pieces', 444-445.

20 Lee-Koo, K. (2014) 'Implementing Australia's National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(3): 300-313, 305-306.

21 Ibid., 311.

Recent years have seen a growth in this whole-of-government approach, where no specific department is named as author or lead, or where there is a broad coalition between three or more departments. This is especially apparent in the current dataset of NAPs, in which there is an increase in whole-of-government responsibility for the implementation of the WPS agenda. While Foreign Affairs and Gender/Women continue to be the most prominent departments holding responsibility (with the regional split as described above remaining intact), governments have increasingly started to adopt a whole-of-government approach in the NAPs.

The countries whose NAPs have (or have had) a whole-of-government approach include Togo,²² Kyrgyzstan,²³ the Philippines,²⁴ Albania,²⁵ Belgium,²⁶ Georgia,²⁷ Moldova,²⁸ Norway,²⁹ Ukraine,³⁰ the United Kingdom,³¹ the United States³² and Guatemala.³³ The fourth Norwegian NAP explains the approach as follows:

No single body, section or embassy is expected to be able to deliver on all parts of the action plan. It is through joint efforts that we will achieve our ambitions and fulfil our commitments as they are described here.³⁴

The document goes on to say:

The plan has been drawn up in a collaboration between all the ministries that are responsible for its implementation: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security and the Ministry of Children and Equality. Norad has contributed input to the text and analyses, and other directors have also been included to a greater extent than before... Our goal is that the plan will be owned by the whole Norwegian system: foreign service missions and delegations, relevant ministries, directorates, academia and civil society.³⁵

Given the (ever-increasing) breadth of issues encompassed by the WPS agenda (which we discuss in the following section), a whole-of-government approach is likely the most realistic way forward for the effective implementation of the WPS agenda. It recognises that the Agenda is a cross-cutting area that requires expertise from – and implementation by – all of the various elements of government.

22 Togo (2011) 'National Action Plan for the Involvement of Togolese Women in Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: Implementation Strategies for Resolutions 1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

23 Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (2018) 'Decree no. 334-p (r)'.
 24 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (2017) 'National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2017-2022'.

25 Council of Ministers (2018) 'Decision Nr. 524 dated 11.09.2019'.
 26 Kingdom of Belgium (2017) 'Third National Action Plan: "Women, Peace, Security" (2017-2021)', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

27 Government of Georgia (2018) '2018-2020 National Action Plan of Georgia for Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security'.
 28 Government of Moldova (2018) 'Decision on the National Implementation Program of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security for 2018-2021 and the Action Plan regulation the Resolution 1325 Implementation'.

29 Norwegian Ministries (2019) 'Women, Peace and Security (2019-2022)'.
 30 Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) 'National Action Plan on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325: Women, Peace, Security' till 2020'.
 31 United Kingdom (2006) 'UNSCR 1325 – United Kingdom High Level National Action Plan'; UK Government (2012) 'UK Government National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 Women, Peace & Security'; HM Government (2018) 'UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018-2022'.

32 The White House (2011) 'United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security'; The White House (2016) 'The United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security'.

33 Inter-Agency Roundtable on Women (2017) 'National Action Plan for the Implementation of Resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council and Related Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security'.

34 Norwegian Ministries (2019) 'Women, Peace and Security (2019-2022)', 57

35 Ibid., 62




Figure 5: Lead agency in current NAPs (n=81)




Figure 6: Category of lead in current NAPs by region (n=81)

As Figure 5 shows, it is very unusual for civil society to take the role of lead agency in the implementation of the NAP. In fact, the only National Action Plan in our dataset which saw civil society take such a prominent role is the Netherlands' third National Action Plan, which was released in 2016 and covers the period of 2016–2019.

This NAP, in which civil society takes a joint leadership role with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lays out 'a platform for cooperation between government and over 50 Dutch civil society organisations and knowledge institutions' who collaborated in jointly drafting the plan.³⁶ As the document explains:

WO-MEN, representing the civil society organisations and knowledge institutions, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will continue to jointly coordinate all the activities in this third National Action Plan.³⁷

It also, however, notes that, in the eyes of the Security Council at least, responsibility for implementation of the WPS agenda lies with the state, although 'all the signatories share responsibility for this National Action Plan'.³⁸ Later in the document, WO-MEN and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are described as the 'two coordinating partners' of the Plan, with their cooperation framed as 'a means to achieve our overall objective while respecting each other's distinctive roles and mandates'.³⁹

We believe that civil society has an absolutely essential role to play in the development, drafting, implementation, monitoring and revision of NAPs, but needs to be supported by meaningful funding in order to carry out this role. This is something we return to shortly.

36 1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) 'The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016–2019', 3.

37 Ibid., 4.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid., 23.

3. To what extent are new and/or emerging security issues – such as terrorism, climate change and reproductive rights – represented in the NAPs?

NAPs often incorporate a range of issues that extend beyond traditional security concerns. Figure 7 tracks the frequency of mentions of nine such emergent security issues in the full dataset of NAPs. As this figure shows, far from being narrowly construed, the WPS agenda captures diverse issues and concerns. These are sometimes drawn from the Security Council resolutions, and sometimes reflect the context and interests of states and other implementing actors. Trafficking, for example, is prominent in the three NAPs produced by Bosnia and Herzegovina,⁴⁰ while transitional justice is a recurring theme in the Solomon Islands' NAP⁴¹ and terrorism is a primary focus in Jordan's NAP.⁴²

In contrast, trafficking in persons has only recently been formally incorporated into the agenda, as a result of the adoption of UNSCR 2467, which encourages the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate to consider information regarding Member States efforts to address the issue of trafficking in persons and its link with sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict situations committed by terrorist groups as part of their strategic objectives and ideology.⁴³ Interestingly, however, concerns about trafficking were present in even the earliest NAPs, including the first iterations of those produced by Denmark (2005), Norway (2006) and Sweden (2006). In some cases, then, the NAPs are ahead of the curve.

Some issues are quite well established; the needs of refugees, internally displaced persons, and persons seeking asylum, for example, have been part of the WPS agenda since UNSCR 1325 was adopted, and are mentioned in a number of the subsequent resolutions. This issue has also featured quite substantially and consistently in NAPs.




Figure 7: New security issues over time (weighted, n=128)

40 Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees of BiG (2010) 'Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2010–2013'; Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013) 'Action plan for implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2014–2017'; Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees Gender Equality Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2017) 'Action Plan for the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2018–2022'.

41 Ministry of Women, Youth, Children & Family Affairs (2017) 'Solomon Islands Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan 2017–2021'.

42 The Jordanian National Commission for Women (2017) 'Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018–2021'.

43 S/RES/2467, para. 29.

Beyond migration and trafficking, some of the other intersecting issues that have appeared in NAPs as part of the WPS agenda include terrorism, the arms trade, transitional justice issues, climate security, reproductive rights and the rights of LGBTQI people in conflict and conflict-affected settings. This makes the contemporary WPS agenda broad, something that more recent WPS resolutions have explicitly recognised; UNSCR 2242 (2015), for example, notes:

the changing global context of peace and security, in particular relating to rising violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, the increased numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, the impacts of climate change and the global nature of health pandemics.⁴⁴

The broadening of the agenda has, however, proved divisive. Russia and China have both expressed resistance to the idea of the agenda being widened.⁴⁵ This issue became especially prominent with the adoption of Resolution 2467 on 23 April 2019, the ninth resolution of the WPS agenda. Part of this resolution concerned the sexual and reproductive health and rights of victims of conflict-related sexual violence. As Feely et al. (2019) explain:

While there was pushback to the resolution from Russia and China (both of which abstained from voting on it), the US was adamant in its opposition to proposed language on emergency contraception, safe termination of pregnancy and HIV prevention and treatment, and later on previously agreed language relating to sexual and reproductive health that had been proposed as a compromise.⁴⁶

As a result, the final version of the resolution made no reference to sexual and reproductive health,⁴⁷ thus setting 'a dangerous precedent for the agenda'.⁴⁸

There are also things that are conspicuous in their absence, both in the formal agenda and in the NAPs. There are intersections of violence that do not start or end with situations of armed conflict. By defining peace and security as the absence of armed conflict, the WPS agenda overlooks the ways in which security is tied to identity in a given a populace. This point is particularly relevant in relation to First Nations women's experiences in various polities, including Australia, and is commonly encountered in outward-facing NAPs, which can fail to recognise WPS-related issues that arise in the domestic context, for example, or which result from circumstances that do not constitute 'armed conflict' but are nonetheless characterised by widespread criminal violence that may be experienced disproportionately by certain groups.

In order to remain a relevant and responsible agenda, it is vital that WPS actors continue to recognise the different ways in which women's diverse security needs intersect with various other issues. By necessity, this will involve the broadening of the agenda, as new security issues and contexts emerge. At the same time, however, with three veto-holding states who have indicated a reluctance to broaden the agenda, there may be the need to pursue advances in the WPS agenda strategically. We must also be mindful that any thematic expansions of the WPS agenda places greater pressure on civil society working in this space, who must cover more ground with few resources.

⁴⁴ S/RES/2242, preamble.

⁴⁵ Basu, S. (2016) 'The global South writes 1325 (too)', *International Political Science Review*, 37(3): 362-374, 363-364.

⁴⁶ Feely, G., L. Courtois, R. De Wilde and M. Walker (2019) 'The month in women, peace and security: April 2019', *Australian Strategic Policy Institute*.

⁴⁷ Goishabib, S. (2019) 'What we think about the new Women, Peace and Security resolution', *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*.

⁴⁸ Allen, L. and L.J. Shepherd (2019) 'In pursuing a new resolution on sexual violence Security Council significantly undermines women's reproductive rights', *LSE Centre for Women, Peace and Security*.

4. To what extent is a budget specified in the NAPs?

The lack of sustainable funding is a major obstacle to the implementation of the WPS agenda.⁴⁹ For a NAP to be effective, it requires a specific budget allocation for WPS activities, a 'predictable and sustainable financing' source, and proper management and tracking of funds.⁵⁰ As it stands, however, a large percentage of NAPs fail to allocate a specific budget for WPS activities.

As Figure 8 shows, most budgets either have no or very little specification of how the NAP-producing country intends to fund their NAP activities (see Appendix 4 for details on the six-point coding framework).




Figure 8: Level of budget specification in all NAPs, 0–5 (n=128)

49 Coomaraswamy et al. *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 246; Goldberg, D., A. Fal, E. Kamler, S. Khan, R. Stanger, E.V. Chowdhury, and K. Yzique (2015) 'Global report: Civil society organization (CSO) survey for the Global Study on Women, Peace and Security CSO Perspectives on UNSCR 1325 implementation 15 years after adoption', 62.

50 Coomaraswamy et al. *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 246–247; Cordaid and GNWP (2014) *Financing for the Implementation of National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325: Critical for Advancing Women's Human Rights, Peace and Security*, 12–13.

Though we note an upward trend in Figure 9, the average level of budget specification remains under 1.5 out of a possible score of 5 (as per Figure 8 above). This is, in short, very disappointing. The lack of sustainable funding has consistently been cited as a barrier to the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Despite the evidence that supports the need for an increase in funding, states continue to perform poorly to the detriment of the agenda.⁵¹

Often, NAPs note that a budget is needed to undertake the WPS activities outlined, but there is no real specification of how much funding would be needed or from where this funding would come (see, for

example, the NAPs of Argentina,⁵² the United States,⁵³ and Belgium⁵⁴). Some NAPs specify that the additional activities are to be absorbed into government departments' existing budgets (such as the NAPs of Spain⁵⁵ and Indonesia⁵⁶). In contrast, the NAPs that stood out in this analysis were those in which the budget was well defined, recognising that each section – or even each activity – has specific funding needs, which are enumerated (see, for example, the NAPs of Albania,⁵⁷ Burkina Faso,⁵⁸ The Gambia,⁵⁹ Jordan,⁶⁰ and Ukraine⁶¹).

The current set of NAPS does not give us any reason for hope, as shown in Figures 10 and 11.




Figure 9: Average level of budget specification in all NAPs over time

51 Coomaraswamy et al. *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 368–391; Skjelsbæk, I., and T.L. Tryggestad (2019) 'Donor states delivering on WPS: The case of Norway', in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 515–527, 521.

52 El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional (2015) 'National Action Plan of the Argentine Republic of the implementation of resolution no. 1325 (2000) of the United Nations Security Council et seq.', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

53 The White House (2011) 'United States National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security'.

54 Kingdom of Belgium (2017) 'Third National Action Plan: "Women, Peace, Security" (2017–2021)', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

55 Gobierno de España (2017) 'Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security'.

56 Coordinating Minister of People's Welfare of the Republic of Indonesia (2014) 'The National Action Plans for the protection and empowerment of women and children during social conflicts of 2014–2019'.

57 Council of Ministers (2018) 'On approving the Action Plan on implementation of the resolution 1325 of the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security, 2018–2020'.

58 Ministry for the Promotion of Women and Ministry of Human Rights and Civic Promotion (2012) 'National Action Plan of Burkina Faso for the implementation of resolution 1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

59 Republic of the Gambia (2012) 'The Gambia National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council resolution 1325'.

60 The Jordanian National Commission for Women (2017) 'Jordanian National Action Plan (JONAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security 2018–2021'.

61 Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) 'National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325 "Women. Peace. Security" till 2020'.




Figure 10: Level of budget specification in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)




Figure 11: Average level of budget specification in current NAPs (n=81)

Here, the downward trend is clear, and particularly apparent in the NAPs adopted since 2014. There is a group of countries that display this downward trend starkly: those which have had more detailed specification of budget in an earlier NAP than in a subsequent NAP. For example, the United Kingdom's third NAP⁶² identified the specific pools of money that would fund the NAP activities (though it did not break activities down into specific financial allocations), while its fourth NAP⁶³ indicates that the current position is for 'UK Government departments [to] fund work from their core budgets'.⁶⁴

Rwanda and the DRC are interesting cases with regard to their budgets. In Rwanda's first NAP – published in 2010⁶⁵ – the state was especially strong in its level of budget specification (and, incidentally, in the level of civil society involvement in planning and in specifying the monitoring and evaluation processes). In that NAP, each activity line had a specific corresponding amount. In Rwanda's second NAP,⁶⁶ however, there is no longer a budget specified in any detail at all. Similarly, the DRC's 2013 NAP⁶⁷ had a very detailed level of budget specification, containing a line-by-line breakdown of the cost of implementing the NAP; the 2019-2022 NAP, by contrast, refers vaguely to a trust fund that has been set up to support the state's WPS activities, with no specific budgets allocated to implementing the plan.⁶⁸

Similarly, the Netherlands' first NAP⁶⁹ recognised that funding was needed to carry out the WPS activities that were outlined in the NAP without specifying from where this budget was to come. The Netherlands' second NAP,⁷⁰ in contrast, identifies the funding commitments – or time in lieu – of the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, of the Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations and of various civil society groups. In doing so, the NAP acknowledges that WPS work requires funding and labour, and quantifies this. However, in the third Dutch National Action Plan, which was published in 2016,⁷¹ the budget specification is again vague, stating that '[t]he Ministry of Foreign Affairs will allocate an annual budget for the implementation of this National Action Plan'.⁷²

This trend does not bode well for the meaningful implementation of the agenda in the years to come. There certainly seems to be a rise in rhetorical commitments by states. Questions remain, however, about whether these commitments can be considered a positive step in the face of a continued lack of meaningful funding. This divide between rhetoric and action is particularly notable when we consider the continued lack of or consistent underfunding of WPS activities by states.⁷³ This issue of NAPs which lack earmarked budgets for WPS is not new, as noted by numerous scholars and practitioners;⁷⁴ its persistence demonstrates, in part, that states do not yet prioritise WPS as part of their broader peace and security agendas.

62 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2014) 'United Kingdom National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security'.

63 HM Government (2018) 'UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace & Security 2018-2022'.

64 Ibid., 24; though we note that this includes the Foreign Commonwealth Office's Global Britain Fund and 'cross-government funds including CSSF [Conflict, Stability and Security Fund]', 24.

65 Republic of Rwanda (2010) 'National Action Plan 2009-2012'.

66 Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (2018) 'Rwanda National Action Plan (2018-2022) for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions'.

67 Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (2013) 'Action Plan of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325'.

68 The Democratic Republic of the Congo Ministry of Gender, Family and Children (2018) 'National Action Plan for implementing United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security, 2nd generation'.

69 Policy Department DSI/SB (2007) 'Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325: Taking a stand for women, peace and security'.

70 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (2011) 'Women: Powerful agents for peace and security: Dutch National Action Plan 2012-2015'.

71 1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) 'The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016-2019'.

72 Ibid.

73 Shepherd and True, 'The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world', 268; Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 247.

74 Shepherd and True, 'The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world', 265-267; Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*; Goldberg et al., *Global Report*; Hudson, 'The power of mixed messages'.

5. To what extent do the NAPs contain provisions for monitoring and evaluation activities?

In addition to sufficient and reliable funding, effective NAPs need robust and clearly defined monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks. Monitoring and evaluation frameworks allow states and stakeholders to be clear about goals, timeframes, resources and indicators; they create consensus on how to evaluate the progress, impact, and implementation of a given WPS initiative in a state or region; and they reduce policy incoherence and duplication.⁷⁵ The absence of systemic approaches to M&E frameworks in NAP development, on the other hand, represents an obstacle to meaningful action on WPS.⁷⁶

On the whole, we found that the M&E specification across all NAPs was generally reasonable; we rated the majority of NAPs as a 3 or above on this indicator (Figure 12; see Appendix 5 for details of the 6-point coding scale). This has also seen a marked improvement over time (Figure 13).




Figure 12: Level of M&E specification in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)

⁷⁵ African Union (2019) 'Continental results framework for reporting and monitoring on the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda in Africa (2018-2028)'.

⁷⁶ Desmidt, S., and L. Davis (2019) *Rhetoric and Real Progress on the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa*; Global Network of Women Peace Builders (2013) *Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally: Localizing UNSCR 1325 in Colombia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sierra Leone, and Uganda*, 55, 82-83; Goldstein et al., *Global Report*, 30.




Figure 13: Average level of M&E specification in all NAPs, 0-5 (n=128)

The current NAPs are no different (Figures 14 and 15); again, while there is room for improvement, most states tended to be able to articulate their anticipated NAP-related activities with a reasonable degree of specificity, with the average level of M&E specification being a little over 3 (in which we considered that an M&E framework is generally defined – such as activities being broadly identified, timeframes being the duration of the NAP and parties somewhat identified).

States have found different ways to represent their WPS commitments through their NAPs, but we found those which were most effective in this respect extensively defined their M&E framework, including a clear and comprehensive specification of the activities that they would undertake along with specific measurable outcomes, timeframes and responsible parties stipulated.




Figure 14: Level of M&E specification in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)

Burundi's NAP contains an example of a strong M&E framework.⁷⁷ Broad objectives are broken into the expected result, the relevant activities that would make up that result, the responsible ministry and any additional partners, and indicators. Each of the activities has a timeframe to the nearest quarter, meaning that, for example, the activity of creating 'a pool of educators for gender and transformative leadership, conflict management and political participation' was expected to take place in the second quarter of 2012. However, we would have liked to see more specificity in the outcomes – so instead of the indicator being '[n]umber of training sessions organised', for example, a stronger framework would replace this with, say, '4 training sessions organised'.

This is something that Ukraine did well in its 2016 NAP;⁷⁸ its indicators were broken down into yearly targets meaning that, under the task of 'preventing and combating violence against women', for example, the NAP anticipated the development of one legislative act annually from 2016–2020, 4 developed materials (one each for 2017–2020) and a total of 268 conducted campaigns (53 in 2016; 54 in 2017; 52 in 2018; 53 in 2019; and 56 in 2020).

There are, however, also challenges associated with setting out a multi-year project with this level of specificity. It may be the case that, for example, a plan that made sense at the outset of the NAP no longer meets the on-the-ground needs four years later, in what might be a dramatically different context. An ongoing question then, is how to balance the need for sufficient specificity to allow for effective implementation, monitoring and evaluation while retaining enough flexibility to ensure that the WPS activities undertaken are still appropriate and effective.

Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms needs commitment from all stakeholders and meaningful, realistic funding to support these activities. There also needs to be a party who ultimately holds responsibility for actually carrying out and overseeing the monitoring and evaluation process and for the 'next steps' to be clearly established should indicators fail to be met. Civil society actors may prove to be valuable partners in independently monitoring a state's implementation of the NAP (and, indeed, many civil society organisations around the world have independently taken on this task), but this is an activity that should be funded, and findings and feedback incorporated in any future iterations.




Figure 15: Average level of M&E specification in current NAPs

77 Republic of Burundi Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender (2011) 'National Action Plan 2012–2016 Action Plan for the implementation of resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

78 Cabinet of Ministries of Ukraine (2016) 'National Action Plan on implementation of UN Security Council Resolution #1325 "Women. Peace. Security" till 2020', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

6. To what extent do the NAPs document the participation of civil society in production and implementation?

Coordination, including with civil society organisations (CSOs), is an important aspect of an effective NAP. Ideally, CSOs are seen 'as an equal partner to its governmental counterparts in all stages'.⁷⁹ One benefit of including CSOs in a meaningful way in the process of NAP development and implementation is that it can promote inclusion.⁸⁰ The inclusion of women and girls in decision-making around peace and security is a central ethos of UNSCR 1325. Given that participation is a central pillar of WPS, it is vital for inclusivity to be built into the development of NAPs and the implementation of the WPS agenda. This means not only consulting civil society in developing and implementing NAPs but consulting *widely* with civil society (such as in rural or regional areas as well as in cities) to ensure that challenges to peace and security experienced by specific populations are recognised and incorporated.

High impact NAPs have an 'inclusive design process' where various government agencies, CSOs and vested actors are ideally 'represented in both the creation and implementation of the plan'.⁸¹ The inclusive design process, however, is often frustrated by a lack of clarity around the role of CSOs in the WPS development and implementation process, and an absence of adequate coordination mechanisms to mediate the relationship between government and CSOs.

The inclusion of voices from civil society has another important benefit: that of localisation, which focuses on contextualisation of NAPs to specific states' socio-political environments. Localisation with regards to WPS refers to initiatives that are aimed at reinterpreting and reconstructing UNSCR 1325, an international norm, to specific sub-national contexts.⁸² Localisation focuses on ownership of WPS by encouraging the inclusion of local voices and knowledge to further the implementation of UNSCR 1325.⁸³ A NAP that focuses on local knowledge, contexts, and needs is more likely to be responsive and effective as opposed to wholesale policy transfers from the international context or emulation of other states' NAPs.⁸⁴

As Figures 16 and 17 demonstrate, there is some degree of engagement with civil society in the development of the NAPs, but there is scope for more clearly defined and substantive input. Very few NAPs, for example, name civil society as a co-drafter along with the state (with the Netherlands' third National Action Plan – noted above – being one exception). Most NAPs, however, either have very limited or no clear engagement with civil society at all (see Appendix 6 for the coding framework that we used).

However, there is evidence that the level of engagement with civil society is increasing, which is a promising sign. As Figure 17 shows, the average level of engagement has doubled over the timeframe studied.

79 Jacevic, M.M. (2018) 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 274–289, 279.

80 Fritz, J. M. (2018) 'Creating or Improving a National Action Plan based on UN Security Council resolution 1325', in S. Shekhawat (ed.), *Gender, Conflict, Peace, and UNSC Resolution 1325*, Lanham, United States: Lexington Books, 83–98; Jacevic, 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans'; Mundkur, A. and L.J. Shepherd (2018) 'Civil Society Participation in Women, Peace and Security Governance: Insights from Australia', *Security Challenges*, 14(2): 83–103.

81 Jacevic, 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', 279–280.

82 Aharoni, S.B. (2014) 'Internal variation in norm localization: Implementing Security Council Resolution 1325 in Israel', *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society*, 21(1): 1–25; Global Network of Women Peace Builders (2013) *Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally*.

83 Global Network of Women Peace Builders (2013) *Implementing Locally, Inspiring Globally*, 5.

84 Coomaraswamy et al., *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace*, 15, 168, 243, 250.




Figure 16: Level of documented engagement with civil society in all NAPs, 0–5 (n=128)




Figure 17: Average level of documented engagement with civil society in NAPs over time (n=128)

However, the current NAPs paint a less positive picture. Most current NAPs mention civil society in passing, by way of a thank you on an acknowledgements page, for example, but provide no real specification of activity or extent of involvement. When acknowledgements are given, engagement with civil society tends to be framed very vaguely: many NAPs noted ‘consultations with’ or ‘feedback provided by’ civil society actors, without indicating whether or not the expertise of civil society was actually incorporated into the final version of the report.

While the positive trend continues in the current dataset (Figure 19), it is much less pronounced than in the full dataset (Figure 17), suggesting that the substantive inclusion of civil society in the development of NAPs is slowing down. However, we are hopeful that the high average level of engagement demonstrated in 2019 is not an outlier in recent years, and that CSO engagement continues to rise in the coming years.

Two NAPs that demonstrate a strong commitment to engaging with civil society in a meaningful way are those of Timor Leste and Togo. The development of the NAP in Timor Leste involved extensive collaboration between civil society and the government throughout the NAP process, from early awareness-raising and advocacy activities and learning exercises to high-level and national consultations, and the report was drafted jointly by members of a Drafting Team made up of government and civil society members.⁸⁵ While the government takes responsibility for implementing the NAP, the NAP indicates that civil society will play a role in ‘support[ing] implementation and monitoring of NAP on UNSCR 1325 activities,

advocat[ing] resource allocation and implementation of the plan, and develop[ing] shadow reporting on progress achieved’.⁸⁶ Timor Leste’s level of monitoring and evaluation specification is also positive. However, it has very little by way of budget specification; while we applaud the extensive consideration and inclusion of civil society in this NAP, it goes without saying that the time, involvement and expertise of members of civil society need to be fairly remunerated, and that civil society needs to be properly funded in order to be able to continue its work.

This is also the case in Togo, in which the government, civil society, national trade unions and the United Nations collaborated to draft the NAP.⁸⁷ Civil society is seen as having a central role in the development and implementation of Togo’s WPS-related activities, conducting various ‘awareness-raising, informational and training activities’ including advocacy campaigns, marches, debates, and a Caravan for Peace.⁸⁸ Again, however, the NAP is conspicuously silent on who is going to pay for the time, effort and expertise of civil society. We can see the same pattern in the NAPs of Australia,⁸⁹ Ireland,⁹⁰ Philippines,⁹¹ and the Netherlands.⁹²

Cameroon and Burundi are exceptions here. Cameroon’s NAP evinces both a commitment to work meaningfully with civil society and to recognise that courses and workshops, advocacy campaigns, gender-sensitive support programmes, and the building and maintenance of strategic alliances require funding – and they do so with a concrete amount for every single activity.⁹³ Indeed, the Cameroonian and Burundian NAPs come closest to representing ‘best practice’ insofar as the reporting of civil society

85 Government of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste (2016) ‘National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (2016–2020)’, 6.

86 Ibid., 8.

87 Togo (2011) ‘National Action Plan for the involvement of Togolese women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding: Implementation strategies for resolutions 1325 and 1820 of the Security Council of the United Nations’, unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

88 Ibid., 2.

89 Australian Government (2012) ‘Australian National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2012–2018’.

90 An Roinn Gnóthaí Eachtracha Agus Trádála (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) (2011) ‘Ireland’s National Action Plan for implementation of UNSCR 1325, 2011–2014’; Rialtas Na Héireann (Government of Ireland) (2015) ‘Ireland’s Second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security (2015–2018)’.

91 ‘The Philippine National Action Plan on UNSCRs 1325 & 1820: 2010–2016’; Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (2017) ‘National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security’.

92 ‘Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325’; 1325/Dutch NAP Partnership (2016) ‘The Netherlands National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2016–2019’.

93 Republic of Cameroon (2017) ‘National Action Plan for the 1325 resolution and companion resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security’.




Figure 18: Level of documented engagement with civil society in current NAPs, 0-5 (n=81)




Figure 19: Average level of documented engagement with civil society in current NAPs (n=81)

engagement, budget specification and monitoring and evaluation indicators are concerned. Burundi's NAP is similarly detailed across all three of civil society, funding and M&E.⁹⁴ However, the NAPs of both Cameroon and Burundi note that funding is contingent on the finding of external partners – in the case of Cameroon, a workshop was held in 2011 in order to 'identify available and potential sources of funding' for the implementation of the NAP,⁹⁵ while Burundi's NAP refers to the identification of possible 'financial technical partners'.⁹⁶ Thus, while both NAPs are commendable for their recognition of the need to fund civil society activity in relation to WPS, these commitments may not eventuate into actual resources for the civil society organisations engaging in WPS work.

For the reasons we note above, it is vital for governments to engage with civil society when developing WPS NAPs. As we have identified, there are countries which have developed a strong relationship with civil society in this space. However, the overwhelming majority of NAP-producing countries have not acknowledged the inconvenient fact that civil society cannot operate without funding. Civil society cannot sustainably provide free advice, free advocacy, free shadow reports, free feedback, free consultation services or free support to people on the ground. Nor, indeed, should it be expected to. If states actually value civil society's input – as many NAPs proclaim – they need to fund civil society actors.

94 Republic of Burundi (2011) 'Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd).

95 Republic of Cameroon (2017) 'National Action Plan for the 1325 resolution and companion resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on Women, Peace and Security', 8.

96 Republic of Burundi (2011) 'Action Plan for the implementation of Resolution 1325 (2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations', unofficial translation, funded by ARC DP160100212 (CI Shepherd), 68.

Conclusions, considerations, and recommendations

There are different views on what makes a WPS NAP an effective policy framework; however, there are some consistent themes that emerge throughout the literature. These include the importance of funding, political will and coordination; inclusion and localisation; and systemic monitoring and evaluation frameworks. An effective NAP identifies policy priorities and outlines concrete steps, such as funding and resource allocation, toward addressing them. Furthermore, it contains a clear strategy for collaboration with local or regional CSOs and interest groups; and establishes indicators for measuring and evaluating progress, including time frames. A good NAP represents a strategic roadmap or tool to further the implementation of the state's WPS policy and should hold actors accountable to their commitments.⁹⁷ The NAP itself is not a replacement or proxy for substantive policy goals and implementation initiatives;⁹⁸ it is a planning and strategic tool, not an end in and of itself. A NAP is 'a blueprint that governments, multilateral institutions, and civil society can use to coordinate action and track results'.⁹⁹

The renewed emphasis on indicators of efficacy in WPS is open to manipulation to produce 'predetermined results'; and has the potential to undermine meaningful action.¹⁰⁰ An 'ideal' NAP (based on the 6-point scale that we have used in this report), containing a clear and earmarked budget, detailed, timebound and specific M&E expectations and with a CSO co-drafter is nonetheless irrelevant if it is not actually implemented. We also recognise that an undue focus on concrete and measurable outcomes may come at the expense of more flexible and ambitious impact-focused indicators.

Indeed, a focus on 'effectiveness indicators' is usually concerned with quantified data, and overlooks the multiplicity of ways in which the WPS agenda is incorporated and transformed in the process of NAP development, the convergence of different policy frameworks (such as defence, anti-terrorism and foreign policy), and the political and institutional factors that may impede or facilitate meaningful action.¹⁰¹ While the findings that we present above give some insight into contemporary NAPs, this is clearly not the only story that could be told about NAP formation and implementation. A fuller understanding of these documents would require a complementary qualitative enquiry.¹⁰²

97 Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 'Women in peace and security', 53.

98 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2014) 'OSCE study on National Action Plans on the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325', 27.

99 Hood, M. (2016) 'What are National Action Plans and why do they matter?'.

100 Castillo-Díaz, P. and H. Cueva-Beteta (2018) 'The promise and limits of indicators on Women, Peace and Security', in F. Ní Aoláin, N. Cahn, D.F. Haynes, and N. Valji (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 185-196; Hudson, N.F. (2018) 'The challenges of monitoring and analyzing WPS for scholars', in S.E. Davies and J. True (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace, and Security*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

101 Chowdhury Fink, N., and A. Davidian (2018) 'Complementarity and convergence?: Women, Peace and Security and counterterrorism', in F. Ní Aoláin, N. Cahn, D.F. Haynes, and N. Valji (Eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Gender and Conflict*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 157-168.

102 In particular, the process of NAP development has not typically been systematically documented by states and stakeholders; see Miller, Pournik and Swaine, 'Women in peace and security', 18. As such, the literature tends to focus on a handful of recurrent case studies that exhibit best practice and are exemplars of 'success'; Abdela, L. (2011) 'Nepal and the implementation of UNSCR 1325', in F. Olonisakin, K. Barnes, and E. Ikpe (Eds), *Women, Peace and Security: Translating Policy into Practice*, London: Routledge, 66-87, 73-77; Skjelsbæk and Tryggestad, 'Donor states delivering on WPS', 519-522. However, given that the early wave of WPS NAPs emerged out of Europe, the literature on best-practice is heavily skewed by assumptions that are steeped in European beliefs about security, race, and women's agency; Basu, 'The global South writes 1325 (too)', Lee-Koo and Trojanowska, 'Does the United Nations' Women, Peace and Security agenda speak with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific?', 291; Pratt, N. (2013) 'Reconceptualizing gender, reinscribing racial-sexual boundaries in international security: The case of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on "Women, Peace and Security"', *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(4): 772-783. The view that WPS is a product of the global North reinforces 'a world in which problems occur "elsewhere", but solutions can be found "here"': Shepherd, 'Making "War Safe for Women?", 325. Consequently, whole regions, like the Asia-Pacific, remain under-researched in the WPS literature; Lee-Koo and Trojanowska, 'Does the United Nations' Women, Peace and Security agenda speak with, for or to women in the Asia Pacific?', 291-292.

A precursor to an effective WPS NAP, as in any policy area, is political will. 'Political will, in which leaders prioritize the central inclusion and security of women and girls, is very important in change initiatives'.¹⁰³ Similarly, Jacevic explains political will as meaning 'that critical government ministries and agencies recognize the value of their NAP, are committed to its progress, and take action to implement it'.¹⁰⁴ Political will extends to all levels of governments but it requires a concerted top-down approach to be effective. The development of NAPs in socio-political conditions that are actively averse to the advancement of women and their inclusion in the political process lends itself to implementation failures.

NAPs have a great deal of potential. Eighty-two states and counting have had someone – usually many someones – sit down and reflect on what the WPS agenda means in the context of their country. NAPs require consideration – and no doubt negotiation – of priorities, responsibilities, funding, and the ideas of gender, peace, and security. NAPs (perhaps inadvertently) reveal a lot about countries: which relationships they see as valuable, how they see their place in the world, and what the most pressing security issues are perceived to be.

But NAPs shouldn't just be documents. The whole point of a NAP is that it is to be implemented: so that more women will take part in peace negotiations; so that gender-based violence is reduced, or eliminated, in conflict and post-conflict contexts; so that necessary services are funded on the ground; and, of course, so that, ultimately, conflict is prevented. As we approach the anniversary of the first twenty years of the WPS agenda, this, then, must be the goal: now is the time for states to move from rhetoric to commitment, and from plan to implementation.

103 Fritz, 'Creating or Improving a National Action Plan', 87.

104 Jacevic, 'WPS, states, and the National Action Plans', 283.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The complete dataset (n=128)

# NAPs in country	Country	Year		
1	Afghanistan	2015		
1	Albania	2018		
1	Angola	2017		
1	Argentina	2015		
1	Armenia	2019		
1	Australia	2012		
2	Austria	2007	2012	
3	Belgium	2008	2013	2017
3	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010	2014	2018
1	Bougainville	2016		
1	Brazil	2017		
1	Burkina Faso	2012		
1	Burundi	2012		
1	Cameroon	2018		
2	Canada	2010	2017	
1	CAR	2012		
2	Chile	2009	2015	
1	Cote D'Ivoire	2008		
1	Croatia	2011		
1	Czech Republic	2017		
3	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2010	2013	2018
3	Denmark	2005	2008	2014
1	El Salvador	2017		
2	Estonia	2010	2015	
3	Finland	2008	2012	2018
2	France	2010	2015	
1	Gambia	2012		
3	Georgia	2012	2016	2018
2	Germany	2013	2017	
1	Ghana	2012		
1	Guatemala	2017		
1	Guinea	2009		
1	Guinea-Bissau	2010		
3	Iceland	2008	2013	2018
1	Indonesia	2014		
1	Iraq	2014		
3	Ireland	2011	2015	2019
3	Italy	2010	2014	2016
1	Japan	2015		
1	Jordan	2018		
1	Kenya	2016		

# NAPs in country	Country	Year			
1	Kosovo	2013			
2	Kyrgyzstan	2013	2018		
1	Liberia	2009			
1	Lithuania	2011			
1	Luxembourg	2018			
1	Macedonia	2013			
1	Mali	2012			
1	Moldova	2018			
1	Montenegro	2017			
1	Mozambique	2018			
1	Nepal	2011			
1	New Zealand	2015			
1	Niger	2016			
2	Nigeria	2013	2017		
4	Norway	2006	2011	2015	2019
2	Palestine	2015	2017		
1	Paraguay	2015			
2	Philippines	2010	2017		
1	Poland	2018			
2	Portugal	2009	2014		
1	Republic of Korea	2014			
1	Romania	2014			
2	Rwanda	2009	2018		
1	Senegal	2011			
2	Serbia	2010	2017		
1	Sierra Leone	2010			
2	Slovenia	2010	2018		
1	Solomon Islands	2017			
1	South Sudan	2015			
2	Spain	2007	2017		
3	Sweden	2006	2009	2016	
4	Switzerland	2007	2010	2013	2018
1	Tajikistan	2014			
3	The Netherlands	2008	2012	2016	
1	Timor Leste	2016			
1	Togo	2011			
1	Uganda	2008			
1	Ukraine	2016			
4	United Kingdom	2006	2010	2014	2018
2	United States of America	2011	2016		

Appendix 2: Dataset of ‘current’ NAPs (n = 81)

Country	Year of publication
Afghanistan	2015
Albania	2018
Angola	2017
Argentina	2015
Armenia	2019
Australia	2012
Austria	2012
Belgium	2017
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2017
Bougainville	2016
Brazil	2017
Burkina Faso	2012
Burundi	2011
Cameroon	2017
Canada	2017
Central African Republic	2014
Chile	2015
Cote d'Ivoire	2008
Croatia	2011
Czech Republic	2017
Democratic Republic of the Congo	2018
Denmark	2014
El Salvador	2017
Estonia	2015
Finland	2018
France	2015
Gambia	2012
Georgia	2018
Germany	2017
Ghana	2012
Guatemala	2017
Guinea	2009
Guinea-Bissau	2010
Iceland	2018
Indonesia	2014
Iraq	2014
Ireland	2019
Italy	2016
Japan	2015
Jordan	2017
Kenya	2016

Country	Year of publication
Kosovo	2014
Kyrgyzstan	2018
Liberia	2009
Lithuania	2011
Luxembourg	2018
Macedonia	2012
Mali	2012
Moldova	2018
Montenegro	2017
Mozambique	2018
Nepal	2011
New Zealand	2015
Niger	2016
Nigeria	2017
Norway	2019
Palestine	2017
Paraguay	2015
Philippines	2017
Poland	2018
Portugal	2014
Republic of Korea	2014
Romania	2014
Rwanda	2018
Senegal	2011
Serbia	2017
Sierra Leone	2010
Slovenia	2018
Solomon Islands	2017
South Sudan	2015
Spain	2017
Sweden	2016
Switzerland	2018
Tajikistan	2014
The Netherlands	2016
Timor-Leste	2016
Togo	2011
Uganda	2008
Ukraine	2016
United Kingdom	2018
United States of America	2016

Appendix 3: NVivo searches for new and/or emerging security issues and for pillars

Issue	Actual search term in NVivo
refugee/IDP	asylum OR refugee OR displaced
disasters	disasters
LGBTQI+	LBQ OR LGBT OR LGBTQ OR LGBTQI OR LGBTQIA OR gay OR lesbian OR queer OR homosexual
sexual and reproductive health	reproductive
human trafficking	traffick
climate change	environment OR climate OR environmental
civil society	"civil society"
transitional justice mechanisms	"transitional justice" OR reconciliation OR reparations
sexual violence	"sexual violence" OR rape OR "sexual and gender-based violence" OR "sexual and other violence" OR "gender-based violence" OR "gender-based persecution"
small arms and light weapons	"arms trade" OR "small arms" OR "light weapons"
terrorism/extremism	terrorism OR terror OR terrorist OR extremism OR extremist OR radical OR radicalized OR radicalised OR radicalisation OR radicalization
prevention	prevention
participation	participation
protection	protection

Appendix 4: 6-point scale – Budget

Budget	
0	No mention of budget
1	Budget is mentioned but no specification (such as being included in agencies' existing budgets)
2	Budget is mentioned but ill-defined (such as there being a recognition of a need for a dedicated budget for the implementation of the NAP, but without one being provided)
3	Budget is broadly defined (such as the provision of an overall total amount for the implementation of the NAP)
4	Budget is well-defined (such as each section of activity having a clearly specific budget)
5	Budget is extensively defined (with each individual activity having a corresponding budget line)

Appendix 5: 6-point scale – Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring and evaluation	
0	No mention of M&E
1	Mention of M&E but no specification (such as a recognition that M&E is important but without indicating how it will be undertaken)
2	Mention of M&E but ill-defined (may only have some of activities, timeframes and responsible parties, with little detail on that which is included)
3	M&E is broadly defined (such as activities broadly defined, timeframes being the duration of the NAP and parties broadly identified)
4	M&E is well defined (such as an indication of two of the three of: specific activities including measurable outcomes, as well as timeframes and responsible party/ies).
5	M&E is extensively defined (with a clear and comprehensive specification of specific activities including measurable outcomes, as well as timeframes and responsible party/ies).

Appendix 6: 6-point scale – Documented level of civil society engagement in the development of the NAP

Civil society engagement	
0	There is no civil society involvement in the NAP
1	There is a mention of civil society (such as a thank you given on an acknowledgements page but no specification of activity or extent of involvement)
2	Civil society involvement is ill-defined (such as a reference to civil society being consulted on the NAP but without any clear indication of what that meant)
3	Civil society involvement is clearly defined (such as a reference to civil society being involved in a focus group or a steering committee)
4	Civil society involvement is extensively defined (such as civil society being offered the opportunity to provide feedback on a draft of the NAP or providing comprehensive input into the drafting process)
5	Civil society co-drafted the NAP

